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Judging Statutes: Thoughts on Statutory Interpretation 
and Notes for a Project on the Internal Revenue Code  
Lee Epstein 
Nancy Staudt 
Peter Wiedenbeck 
INTRODUCTION 
Why do judges interpret statutes the way they do? Positivist 
analyses aimed at answering this question abound and, perhaps not so 
surprisingly, have supplied no shortage of responses. Some suggest 
that the primary determinant centers on the internal political 
ideologies of judges. That is, jurists will interpret statutes in line with 
their sincerely held policy preferences.1 A second group points to the 
external context, arguing that judges behave in a strategic fashion vis-
à-vis other relevant actors. That is, judges will read statutes in such a 
fashion as to maximize their policy preferences within the limits set 
by outside political constraints; for example, to avoid triggering a 
congressional override.2 Still others argue that statutory interpretation 
has less to do with policy maximization than it does with principle 
maximization, that is, jurists interpret statutes in accord with their 
 
  Lee Epstein is the Edward Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor of 
Political Science, and Professor of Law, Washington University; Nancy Staudt and Peter 
Wiedenbeck are Professors of Law, Washington University. The authors are grateful to Scott 
Hendrickson for his excellent research assistance. 
 1. Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and 
Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28, 41, 42-43 (1997); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, 
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 344-49 (2002).  
 2. An example of outside constraints is the congressional override. See Lee Epstein & 
Thomas G. Walker, The Role of the Court in American Society: Playing the Reconstruction 
Game, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 322-24 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995); William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 334, 337-79, 
390-91 (1991) [hereinafter Eskridge, Overriding]; William Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History?: 
Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613, 642-46, 664-66 
(1991) [hereinafter Eskridge, Reneging]; Andrew D. Marin, Public Policy, the Supreme Court, 
and the Separation of Powers, Sept. 1, 1998 (transcript on file with the Journal of Law & 
Policy).  
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preference for adhering to precedent, or particular ideas, theories, or 
philosophies. They may pursue these goals sincerely or strategically, 
depending upon the specific account.3 
Other responses exist of course. To us, however, the more 
interesting features of the non-normative literature on statutory 
interpretation lie not in the distinctive conclusions it has generated, 
but rather in its commonalities. We see two as particularly 
interesting. First, many of the relevant studies focus on civil rights 
legislation.4 This holds true regardless of whether the work’s 
producers are legal academics or social scientists, whether the 
research is primarily qualitative or quantitative, or whether it finds its 
theoretical grounding in psychology, sociology, or economics. 
Second, almost all the studies—especially those of the large-n, 
quantitative variety—explore the outcomes reached by jurists, and 
not the rationale or justifications they invoke.5 To be sure, the 
outcomes under investigation differ from study to study—sometimes 
it is support for the government or not; in others, it is whether the 
judge reached a “liberal” or “conservative” decision. However, the 
unmistakable focus is on the result, to the neglect of the rationale. 
These are not criticisms of the extant literature. Quite the 
opposite: we firmly believe that by investigating outcomes reached in 
civil rights cases, this line of inquiry has revealed a great deal about 
the “judicial mind.” At the same time, we believe just as firmly that if 
we are to fully understand the determinants of statutory 
interpretation, then a continued emphasis on civil rights is, for 
reasons we specify in Part I, a potential problem.6 And, to the extent 
that we desire a more comprehensive picture of judicial behavior, an 
 
 3. See generally John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic 
Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565, 574, 579-80, 581-82 (1992). 
 4. See, e.g., Segal, supra note 1, at 36; Eskridge, Reneging, supra note 2, at 617-64. 
Though there are exceptions, most of the literature also focuses on lower federal court judges. 
See, e.g., Daniel M. Schneider, Empirical Research on Judicial Reasoning: Statutory 
Interpretation in Federal Tax Cases, 31 N.M. L. REV. 325, 332-33 (2001). But see Pablo T. 
Spiller & Rafael Gely, Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of 
U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relation Decisions, 23 RAND J. ECON. 463, 464, 477-78 (1992) 
(discussing one of the few studies focusing on the Supreme Court level).  
 5. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 2; Segal, supra note 1, at 36; SEGAL & SPAETH, supra 
note 1, at 324-27; Spiller & Gely, supra note 4, at 477, 490. 
 6. See infra Part I. 
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exclusive focus on outcomes is, for reasons we elaborate on in Part II, 
incomplete at best and misleading at worst.7 
Accordingly, we have devised a project that aspires to address 
these concerns by (1) exploring Supreme Court tax opinions, a body 
of case law that, despite its importance, has received virtually no 
systematic attention, and (2) analyzing or taking into account both 
outcomes and rationales. At the end of the day, we hope that our 
attention to these matters will make a useful contribution to the 
literature on judging statutes. 
The time for presenting results has not yet arrived. While our 
project is well underway, our data set is large, and the task of data 
collection is formidable and ongoing. Rather than reporting results, in 
this Article we hope to accomplish three tasks. First, we make a case 
for moving beyond the arena of civil rights to study interpretation in 
economic contexts (Part I).8 Second, we explain the value of moving 
beyond mere outcomes, and incorporating judicial rationales in the 
analysis of statutory interpretation (Part II).9 Third, we provide 
information about the contours of our study, including a description 
of our data set and an explanation of some of the questions we plan to 
explore (Part III).10 
I. THE CIVIL RIGHTS FOCUS 
A mere glance at the literature reveals that most rigorous 
empirical investigations of statutory interpretation, especially at the 
level of the U.S. Supreme Court, employ civil rights legislation as 
their focus. Those that do not are far more heavily weighted toward 
other types of individual rights-based laws than they are toward more 
economically oriented statutes.11 
To us, this bias presents a potential problem when drawing 
inferences about the general enterprise of statutory interpretation. 
Because the issues and concerns found in civil rights cases are 
 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See infra Part I. 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. But see Spiller & Gely, supra note 4, at 464, 477 (providing an important exception to 
this general rule).  
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different from those involved in business law controversies, the 
accounts offered to explain the resolution of civil rights cases may 
not hold outside that context. 
A. Civil Rights and the Supreme Court Docket 
Based on the extant literature, it would be easy to conclude that 
judges, particularly U.S. Supreme Court justices, spend their days 
interpreting civil rights-type legislation to the exclusion of all other 
types of controversies.12 The literature’s focus on such laws has been 
that intense and deep. Yet, this is quite misleading, as even simple 
counts of the Supreme Court’s plenary agenda would reveal. 
Consider, for example, Figure 1, which depicts the ten 
congressional statutes that have received the most attention from the 
U.S. Supreme Court since its 1953 Term. What emerges is a picture 
not unlike the one Calvin Coolidge painted of America in 1925: the 
business of the Court is business.13 Of the ten statutes most frequently 
appearing before the Court, six pertain primarily to congressional 
attempts to regulate business and the economy; just three center on 
matters of civil rights and liberties, and only two of those are the 
focus of most scholarly work (the Civil Rights Acts). Even if we 
were to combine the amount of litigation incident to those two civil 
rights statutes, the resulting figure would be overwhelmed by cases 
involving the Internal Revenue Code, which has been the subject of 
more litigation than any other statute over the last five decades. To 
think about it another way, of the 2,929 cases in which the Supreme 
Court interpreted a statute, slightly over eight percent (n=242) 
involved the Internal Revenue Code14—a staggering figure in light of 
 
 12. Indeed, scholars and commentators claim that the Court’s docket has shriveled at the 
expense of cases “disputing vital, if less visible, issues like taxes, pensions, federal benefits and 
maritime law.” Ted Gest, The Court; Deciding Less, Writing More, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
June 28, 1993, at 24. See also Glenn W. Reimann, Sour Grapes or Sound Criticism: Is the 
Supreme Court Really Not Taking Enough Non-Tax Business Cases, 8 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 
161, 175-79, 191 (1999) (citing claims that the Court no longer takes business cases and 
arguing that empirical evidence supports the claims). However, the Court has also reduced its 
caseload to such an extent that virtually all areas of the law have suffered. Id. at 167.  
 13. In 1925, Calvin Coolidge remarked, “The business of America is Business.” President 
Calvin Coolidge, Address to the Society of American Newspaper Editors (Jan. 17, 1925), 
reprinted in JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 859 (13th ed. 1995). 
 
 14. Computed from the Spaeth’s U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database (2002 release), at 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol13/iss1/9
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the scores and scores of laws that have come to the Court’s attention 
since 1953. 
Figure 1 
Most Frequently Litigated Congressional Statutes in the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 1953-2001 Terms 
 
 
Note: Bars represent counts of cases. Data are from the U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database 
(2002 release), with analu=0 or 1, and dec_type=1, 6, or 7. The variable depicted is LAW. 
The picture does not change appreciably if we consider patterns 
since the 1960s, when Congress enacted the great bulk of civil rights 
legislation investigated in the literature. Figure 2, which compares 
laws litigated during the Burger Court (1969–1985) and Rehnquist 
Court (1986–2001) eras, makes this crystal clear.15 While the “top ten 
lists” vary—for example, the Bankruptcy Code was among the more 
frequently litigated provisions during the Rehnquist years, but not 
during Burger years—the basic finding unearthed in Figure 1 
 
http://www.polisci.msu.edu/pljp/supremecourt.html, with dec_type=1, 6, or 7, and analu=0 or 1. 
The variable under analysis is AUTHDEC_1. 
 15. The Harvard Law Review’s annual survey of Supreme Court activity for the preceding 
term contains statistics on the types of cases decided, including a category for tax cases. Using 
these data, Moran and Schneider conclude that the Burger court did not slight tax cases, and call 
into question the common belief that the Court loathes tax cases and attempts to avoid them 
whenever possible. Beverly I. Moran & Daniel M. Schneider, The Elephant and the Four Blind 
Men: The Burger Court and Its Federal Tax Decisions, 39 HOW. L.J. 841, 866-67 & n.69 
(1996). 
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remains: it is largely business and economics that have dominated 
and continue to dominate the Court’s statutory agenda.  
Figure 2 
Most Frequently Litigated Congressional Statutes During the 
Burger and Rehnquist Court Eras 
 
 
Note: Bars represent counts of cases. Data are from the U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database 
(2002 release), with analu=0 or 1, and dec_type=1, 6, or 7. The variable depicted is LAW. 
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If the results depicted in Figures 1 and 2 indicate anything, it is 
that scholarly emphasis on civil rights laws touches only the tip of the 
iceberg. To get to the great mass, we ought turn our attention to 
where the Court itself has focused its attention: on the Internal 
Revenue Code, the National Labor Relations Act, the Social Security 
Act, and so on.  
Yet, from the sheer numbers alone we cannot say that a focus on 
civil rights limits our ability to draw inferences about why the Court 
reaches the decisions it does in litigation that calls for interpretation 
of other statutes. Even though civil rights laws are not typical of 
those the Court interprets, it is at least possible that the litigation 
itself is otherwise similar to, say, suits involving the Internal Revenue 
Code.  
But possible is a far cry from likely. We suspect that it is most 
unlikely that what we have learned about statutory interpretation 
from a focus on civil rights transports precisely to other areas of the 
law. Our suspicions are founded on the fact that civil rights cases 
generate a great deal more public and media attention than, say, tax 
suits. According to the extant literature, this suggests that the Court 
may handle the two in distinct ways.  
Figure 3 nicely illustrates this point: If we take a decision’s 
coverage on the front page of the New York Times on the day after the 
Court hands it down as a valid measure of public attention,16 then it is 
quite clear that cases involving the Civil Rights Act of 1964—as 
compared with those asking the Court to interpret the Internal 
Revenue Code—garner significantly more. Of the 184 tax cases, a 
trivial 3.8% (n=7) generated New York Times coverage; in contrast, 
of the 67 Civil Rights Act suits, 37.3% (n=25) generated coverage. 
 
 16. Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66, 72-73, 
76-77 (2000).  
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Figure 3 
A Comparison Between the Proportion of Civil Rights Act of 
1964 Cases and Internal Revenue Code Cases Receiving Front-Page 
Coverage in the New York Times 
 
Note: N=67 (Civil Rights Act); N=184 (Internal Revenue Code). Pearson Chi-Square=49.579 
(p < .001). Bars represent the proportion of statutory civil rights and tax cases that appeared on 
the front page of the New York Times on the day after the Court announced its decision.17 
If this difference in media attention had no effect on Court 
behavior it would not impede our ability to learn about general 
statutory interpretation from a focus on civil rights. That is not, 
however, the case. Many studies have shown that the behavior of the 
justices varies according to whether or not they are resolving an 
especially salient case.18 Numerous scholars, for example, claim that 
Chief Justices tend to assign opinions of great public interest to 
themselves—with some even suggesting that over-self-assignment of 
 
 17. These data are from Epstein & Segal, supra note 16, and are available at 
http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~polisci/epstein/ajps/articleie.html, with analu=0, dec_type=1, 6, or 
7, and law=CRA7 or IRC. 
 18. See Epstein & Segal, supra note 16, at 66-67, 77-79 (reviewing studies that test 
whether the Court is affected by the relative salience of cases or issues). 
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salient cases has all the makings of a norm on the Supreme Court. As 
Danelski explains:  
The Chief Justice has maximal control over an opinion if he 
assigns it to himself, and undoubtedly Chief Justices have 
retained many important cases for that reason. The Chief 
Justice’s retention of “big cases” is generally accepted by the 
Justices. In fact, the expectation is that he should write in those 
cases so as to lend the prestige of his office to the Court’s 
pronouncement.19 
Other scholars suggest that the Court is more likely to produce 
unanimous opinions in salient cases. Indeed, the literature is replete 
with examples of justices, especially Chief Justices, going to great 
lengths to unite their colleagues behind a single opinion when they 
believe that the Court is resolving a dispute of great public moment.20 
This may reflect a perception by Chief Justices that other political 
actors are more likely to acquiesce in unanimous decisions.21  
We could list many more examples, but the general idea would be 
the same: a large amount of evidence suggests that the justices 
exhibit different behavior in cases likely to generate public response. 
Because civil rights cases are significantly more likely to generate 
such a response (at least compared to the tax area), there is good 
reason to be wary of the quality of inferences we can make about 
statutory interpretation in other fields from a focus on civil rights.22  
 
 19. See generally David J. Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional 
Process of the Supreme Court, in COURTS, JUDGES, AND POLITICS 496 (A. Sarat ed., 1989). 
 20. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 42 (1998). RICHARD 
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 878-83 (1976).  
 21. See BRADLEY C. CANON & CHARLES A. JOHNSON, JUDIGICAL POLICIES: 
IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT 51 (2d ed. 1999); Eskridge, Overriding, supra note 2, at 346, 
349-50.  
 22. There are other reasons to be suspicious of the usefulness of inferences drawn from 
civil rights cases. If the justices are indeed attentive to other branches when deciding cases and 
consider the possibility of a congressional override, then the judicial concerns in civil rights 
cases may be very different from those in tax cases. See Eskridge, Overriding, supra note 2, at 
379-82, 385-87 (positing a difference between the relative preferences of the Court and 
Congress in tax and civil rights cases and tracing the strategic implications of that difference). 
Many studies indicate that corporations and business entities lobby Congress for specific tax 
rules, which may lead legislators to pay particular attention to the Court’s tax decisions, even if 
the media virtually ignores them. On the government side, the Treasury’s oversight of the tax 
laws is so intensive that it occasionally convinces congressional tax-writing committees to 
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B. Scholarly Accounts of Statutory Interpretation 
As observed earlier, scholars have offered numerous explanations 
for the outcomes of cases that require the Court to interpret statutes. 
Many of their accounts, however, rest in one way or another on the 
notion of preferences. The simple attitudinal model posits that 
justices generally vote in accordance with their sincerely held 
political preferences, and that no other factors come into play except 
perhaps case-specific facts.23 Most variants of the strategic decision 
model also start from the premise that justices seek to maximize their 
political preferences, but posit that in doing so they take into account 
the likely behavior of other justices and institutions.24 Specifically, 
the strategic decision model asserts that to maximize their policy 
preferences justices must take into account the institutional context in 
which they make their choices, including the responses of actors in 
the other branches of government. This position is founded on the 
observation that, under a system of checks and balances, government 
policy is not the separate sphere of any single branch, but is the 
product of interactions between them. It follows that for any set of 
actors—be they justices, legislators, or the executive—to make 
authoritative policy, they must attend to this institutional constraint 
by formulating expectations about the preferences of the other 
relevant actors and what they expect them to do when making their 
own choices.25 
 
include provisions in omnibus tax reform bills that overturn trial court statutory interpretations. 
See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub L. No. 98-369 § 79(a), 98 Stat. 494, 597 (rejecting the 
interpretation of I.R.C. § 752 that was adopted in Raphan v. United States, 3 Ct. Cl. 457 
(1983)). 
 23. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 86. 
 24. Virtually every existing strategic account of judicial decisions posits that justices 
pursue policy. Their goal is to see public policy—the ultimate state of the law—reflect their 
preferences. But this need not be the case. Under the strategic account, as we suggested earlier, 
researchers could posit any number of other goals, be they jurisprudential or institutional. See 
generally John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 12 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 263 (1992). 
 25. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 20, at 12-17; Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, & Andrew D. 
Martin, The Supreme Court as a Strategic National Policy Maker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583, 585, 
592-95 (2001); Eskridge, Overriding, supra note 2, at 334, 378-79; Eskridge, Reneging, supra 
note 2, at 642-46; Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court 
Decision Making with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases, 6 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 263-300 (1990); Martin, supra note 2; Andrew D. Martin, Congressional Decision 
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Scholars have leveled a number of criticisms at these preference-
based approaches, one of which is particularly relevant to us: these 
models—even strategic accounts, which are attentive to the 
institutional context—neglect the larger socio-political context in 
which justices operate. These scholars assert that variables designed 
to take into account socio-political context are essential. The crime 
rate, for instance, may have a bearing on Court decisions involving 
crime legislation, and so it should be factored into the analysis. 
The force of this critique, as applied to studies of the 
interpretation of civil rights-type legislation, may be debatable. The 
simple, one-dimensional, liberal-conservative metric may adequately 
capture decisional inputs in the voting rights or employment 
discrimination context, for example. But in litigation over things 
economic, the relevance of macroeconomic conditions seems beyond 
debate. In our view, models designed to explain statutory 
interpretation in tax ought take into account not only the general 
political preferences of the justices (and other relevant actors), but 
should also build in a factor to account for the economic context in 
which justices are laboring. The justices may be strategic policy 
maximizers, seeking to etch their personal political preferences into 
law, but we surmise that the state of the economy figures into their 
calculus when making decisions that may well impact the economy. 
Flowing from this belief are hypotheses that would not readily 
emerge from a continued focus on civil rights. For example, perhaps 
the state of the federal budget affects how the Supreme Court 
resolves litigation involving the IRS, such that when the deficit is 
relatively large, the justices are more receptive to the tax collector’s 
arguments.  
This, of course, is casual conjecture; it is not our aim here to do 
much more than speculate either about particular hypotheses or about 
the importance of the economy in general. We only wish to say here 
that that we believe that the posited effect does not come about willy-
nilly, via some magical preference change on the part of justices. 
Instead, it is the product of continued pursuit of personal political 
 
Making and the Separation of Powers, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 361, 362-66 (2001) (legislators); 
Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1, 97-99 (1994); Spiller & Gely, supra note 4, at 467-68. 
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ideology in the face of varying economic contexts26—contexts that 
traditional separation-of-powers-type analyses (even with their 
emphasis on the preferences of relevant political actors) may fail to 
capture. There is, we believe, some link or interplay between 
prevailing economic conditions and the Court’s decisions concerning 
business and economic affairs. Thus, a model that incorporates these 
conditions may yield more satisfying results. 
At this juncture we cannot offer definitive empirical support of 
our claim. Suffice it to note that a mini-test confirms its plausibility. 
To be precise, the data supports one of many possible observable 
implications flowing from this idea—namely, that the U.S. Supreme 
Court is more likely to rule in favor of the U.S. government in tax 
cases when the U.S. budget deficit is large. To conduct the test we 
estimated a very simple (and admittedly entirely underspecified)27 
logit model using maximum likelihood (ML) estimation:28 
Yi ~ Bernoulli(πi) and πi = 1/(1+exp(-xi’)), 
where Yi is a dichotomous variable representing U.S. 
government victory in tax cases heard by the U.S. Supreme 
Court (1=U.S. wins tax case; 0=U.S. does not win tax case),29  
 
 26. See, e.g., Robert H. Durr, What Moves Policy Sentiment?, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 158, 
158-59, 166-67 (1993).  
 27. Other problems also exist. Note that the use of logit/probit models with binary time-
series cross sectional data can be problematic because of the temporal nature of the data, which 
may lead to underestimated standard errors and inflated test statistics. Nathaniel Beck et al., 
Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable, 
42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1260, 1261, 1263 (1998). Given our very modest goals, we simply put 
these potential problems aside for the moment. 
 28. Case outcome, the dependent variable in our analysis, is dichotomous; the United 
States either wins a tax case or it does not. This makes the use of common models, such as 
linear regression, inappropriate. Accordingly, we estimated logit models using maximum 
likelihood. All coefficients reported in the text are logit estimates, and all probabilities are 
derived from logit estimates. 
 29. The data are for the 1946–1997 Terms, and are from the U.S. Supreme Court Judicial 
Database, with analu=0 or 1; dec_type=1, 6, or 7; and value=12. These data present additional 
problems, as the two tax experts on this paper are dissatisfied with the way Spaeth, the compiler 
of the Database, defines Federal Taxation. This issue is discussed further infra Part III. 
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and xi’ is a 1 x k+1 vector of observations on the U.S. budget 
deficit/surplus30 for the given year and the Segal/Cover 
preference scores31 for the median justice on the Court for the 
given year. 
The results support the hypothesis of interest: the coefficient on 
the budget deficit/surplus variable is statistically significant (at the 
=.05 level), and in the expected direction.32  
More interesting, though, may be the substantive implications of 
the results, for which we can get a feel by examining counterfactuals. 
Consider Table 1. Here we present a summary of the probability that 
the Supreme Court will decide a tax case in favor of the U.S. 
government as the budget deficit/surplus variable increases from its 
 
 30. LYNN RAGSDALE, VITAL STATISTICS ON THE PRESIDENCY 361-62 (1998) (measuring 
budget deficit/surplus in billions of current U.S. dollars). 
 31. See generally Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of 
U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 559-60 (1989) (discussing and 
assigning “Segal/Cover scores” to the Supreme Court justices). The authors devised measures 
of the ideological preferences of the Justices by examining editorials written prior to Senate 
confirmation. The scores are highly satisfactory predictors of votes in many areas of the law, 
particularly civil rights and liberties, but are less so in others (including tax, which presents yet 
another potential problem with our analysis). We assume, in line with the social science 
literature, that the more liberal the median, the more likely the Court will support the 
government in tax cases—even though this assumption, too, is probably flawed for many kinds 
of disputes in this area. For more on this point, see infra Part III. 
 32. The results are as follows: 
Variable ML Logit Coefficient (Standard Errors) 
Constant .42399 (.25833) 
U.S. Budget 
Deficit/Surplus 
-.00587 
(.00281) 
Median Justice 1.28454 (.50519) 
N 298 
Pseudo R2 .0182 
LR-test (2) 6.37 
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minimum observed value (-$290.1 billion) to its maximum observed 
value ($8.9 billion), holding the median justice variable constant at its 
mean.33 
Table 1 
Predicted Probability of a U.S. Government Win in a Tax Case 
Before the Supreme Court. 
 Predicted Probability 
of U.S. Government 
Win 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Budget Deficit of 
-$290.1 billion .9013 [.7499, .9772] 
Budget Surplus of 
$8.9 billion .6557 [.5623, .7380] 
Note: The median justice variable is held constant at its mean value. 
What we see is that, as the budget deficit/surplus increases from 
its minimum observed value to its maximum observed value, the 
probability that the Court will rule in favor of the U.S. government 
decreases by .2456. As indicated by the 95% confidence interval, this 
change in probability is not attributable to chance. Figure 4 displays a 
graph of this changing probability as budget deficit/surplus increases 
from its minimum observed value to its maximum observed value. 
 
 33. We used CLARIFY to derive the predicted probabilities and confidence intervals. For 
information on CLARIFY, see Gary King et al., Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: 
Improving Interpretation and Presentation, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 341, 360 (2000). 
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Figure 4 
Changing Probability of a U.S. Government Win in the Supreme 
Court as the Budget Deficit/Surplus Moves from Minimum to 
Maximum Observed Values 
 
Note: The Y-axis represents the probability of a win by the U.S. government in tax cases; the 
X-axis depicts the value of the budget surplus/deficit. The length of the lines represents the 
width of the 95% confidence interval. 
Of course, given various problems in the analysis, one cannot 
draw grand conclusions from these preliminary results. They 
nonetheless suggest that in the tax area we should view the Court’s 
work in terms of a political economy of judicial decision making. An 
exclusive focus on civil rights cases would continue to miss this 
interesting phenomenon. 
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II. “LAW” VERSUS “OUTCOMES” 
Thus far, we have attempted to make the case that problems exist 
in drawing general inferences about the enterprise of statutory 
interpretation from an exclusive focus on civil rights. But this is not 
our only concern about the existing state of the literature. Another 
concern is that virtually every large-n, quantitative investigation of 
statutory interpretation, whether centered on civil rights (as most are) 
or not, has the limited objective of explaining outcomes. The analysis 
above is typical—it examines only government wins and losses. 
Similarly, the focus of Segal’s work on civil rights is on predicting 
whether justices will rule in a “conservative” or “liberal” direction.34 
That social scientists like Segal have produced many such large-n, 
outcome-oriented studies is no surprise. Quite the opposite: it reflects 
their theoretical and methodological orientations toward judging. On 
the theoretical front, many social scientists—especially political 
scientists—believe that the “law” boils down to outcomes, and that 
whatever rationales or justifications judges invoke are mere 
smokescreens designed to hide the fact that politics drives the result. 
Political scientists might ask, “Why bother to study smokescreens 
when it is the outcome that matters to all the relevant actors, 
including the judges?” On the methodological side, most social 
scientists view their primary job as one of making inferences—they 
desire to use facts they know (or can collect) to learn about facts they 
do not know. Making “good” inferences can be accomplished by 
writing down hypotheses derived from theory, developing valid and 
reliable measures of the concepts contained in hypotheses, and 
assessing those operational hypotheses against data systematically 
drawn from the population. Social scientists could apply this 
procedure to study narrow areas of the law (such as Title VII 
litigation, as opposed to all “civil rights” cases) or features of court 
decisions other than outcomes, but they do not. Their goal is to 
understand judicial decision making generally, which pushes them 
away from the narrower, and toward the broadest plausible legal area. 
Moreover, their interest in reliability moves them away from the 
 
 34. See Segal, supra note 1, at 35-36.  
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difficult-to-quantify things (like legal rationales) and toward things 
that they can easily code (like outcomes). Theory and method thus 
conspire to lead social scientists to large-n, outcome-oriented studies.  
This approach, of course, troubles many legal academics. To 
them, explaining decisional law solely by examining case outcomes 
is as absurd as reducing a legal argument to “my client should win in 
this controversy with the IRS because she is the taxpayer, and the 
taxpayer prevailed in the last tax case decided by the Court.” Instead, 
lawyers base their arguments on the facts of the case and on relevant 
legal principles, which principles may be related to, but do not 
mechanistically follow from, prior outcomes. Legal arguments draw 
on the language of the tax statutes, past court decisions, canons of 
statutory interpretation, theories of fairness, and economic rationales. 
The Court uses these documents, concepts, and ideas to produce a 
judicial opinion, which lawyers regard as “law” that constrains lower 
courts and influences future actions of the Supreme Court. 
That is why legal academics tend to eschew large-n analyses and 
focus on small samples. (Often, unfortunately, such samples are 
selected unscientifically or in some undisclosed manner.)35 In 
assaying whether, for example, the Court has created a coherent 
doctrine in a particular area of the law, legal academics are most 
interested in the facts of the cases, the legal authorities relied upon, 
the policy justifications put forward, and the effects of the opinions 
on various individuals and groups.36 Likewise, when legal academics 
 
 35. See generally Moran & Schneider, supra note 15 (presenting a systematic study with a 
small-n sample). Moran and Schneider’s study examines forty-six tax cases decided from 1969 
to 1985, providing the frequency with which the Court relied upon one of four methods for 
reaching a decision on the tax controversy: (1) a plain meaning approach, (2) an intent-based 
approach that encompasses references to the statute’s legislative history, (3) deference to the 
Executive through reliance on Treasury regulations, and (4) a court-centered approach that 
eschews reliance on the statute, legislative history, and regulations. Id. at 875. The authors of 
the study did not attempt to explain the outcomes or even to predict how the Court will decide 
cases in the future. Rather, they note: “[T]he picture reveals a moderate Court that was 
knowledgeable about tax law and the tax system. And more important, the Burger Court used 
its knowledge to good result.” Id. at 942. 
 36. See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax “Benefits” Constitutionally Equivalent to 
Direct Expenditure?, 112 HARV. L. REV. 380 (1998) (investigating eight Supreme Court cases 
and tracing the origins of the constitutional equivalence issue); William A. Klein, Tailor to the 
Emperor With No Clothes: The Supreme Court’s Tax Rules for Deposits and Advance 
Payments, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1685 (1994) (arguing the court developed and relied upon a 
misguided theory for distinguishing between deposits and advance payments). 
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seek to understand the judicial philosophy of an individual jurist, they 
generally do not examine every case authored by that justice, or even 
a systematically drawn sample. Instead, they review a small 
collection of opinions that seem interesting and arguably 
representative of his or her contribution to the law as a whole.37  
In this project, our sympathies in the debate over “outcomes” 
versus “law” lie with the legal academics. We believe that their more 
nuanced understanding forces the researcher to consider how the 
decision-makers conceptualized the legal problem under 
consideration. To take but one example, social scientists code cases 
addressing the Internal Revenue Code as involving one issue: 
“federal taxation.” This description is certainly accurate as far as it 
goes, but it ignores all the subsidiary questions the Court may have 
addressed, including problems of statutory interpretation, concerns 
about the federal budget or the national economy, and general notions 
of equity and efficiency. Moreover, the legal academic’s approach to 
law affords more realistic explanations for the outcomes that the 
social scientists seek to explain. To see this, consider that the social 
scientists’ rule of thumb with regard to tax cases is: code the outcome 
as “liberal” if the government’s position prevailed, and 
“conservative” if the taxpayer won. While this may be a plausible 
first approximation, there are many cases in which it is demonstrably 
false, such as when the government contests Earned Income Tax 
Credit claims by low-income individuals.38 
 
 37. See, e.g., Kirk J. Stark, The Unfulfilled Tax Legacy of Justice Robert H. Jackson, 54 
TAX L. REV. 171 (2001) (exploring “five landmark cases” that Justice Jackson authored); 
Darlene Addie Kennedy, Eschewing the Superlegislative Prerogative: Tax Opinions of Justice 
Clarence Thomas, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 571, 582 (examining five tax cases authored by 
Justice Thomas and arguing that Justice Thomas is “refreshingly direct and unaffected by 
personal predilection or ideological bent”); Stephen B. Cohen, Thurgood Marshall: Tax 
Lawyer, 80 GEO. L.J. 2011, 2011 (1992) (exploring five “landmark” tax opinions authored by 
Justice Marshall and arguing that he “wrote better opinions on the law of federal income 
taxation that any of his fellow justices”). But see BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., DISSENT 
WITHOUT OPINION: THE BEHAVIOR OF JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS IN FEDERAL TAX CASES 
(1975) (describing every tax case in which Justice Douglas participated, arguing that his later 
opinions can be explained by a growing dissatisfaction with administrative agencies and 
antipathy towards the tax code). 
 38. As a further example, Justice Douglas, widely considered to be among the most liberal 
members of the Court (with a Segal-Cover score of .46 on a scale of -1 (most conservative) to 1 
(most liberal); see generally supra note 31), voted in favor of the taxpayer in 73% of the tax 
cases on which he sat during the period from 1959 to 1964, while the Court majority ruled for 
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At the same time, we do not deny the importance of outcomes. 
Outcomes are, as the social scientists maintain, important to a range 
of political actors and, of course, to the parties themselves. Indeed, 
one question we hope to address in our project is whether certain 
rationales and policy considerations that come into play when 
interpreting the Internal Revenue Code lead to predictable outcomes. 
For example, is discussion of administrative concerns (such as the 
advantages of uniform, low-cost enforcement, minimizing 
bureaucratic discretion, or reducing the need for intrusive monitoring, 
information gathering or record keeping), generally associated with a 
government victory? 
We also appreciate the rigor with which social scientists approach 
their work, and we follow their general rules and procedures in 
conducting our study.39 So, for example, we do not hand-select cases 
that seem interesting; we are investigating all tax cases decided by 
the Court.40 Likewise, we are not basing our analyses on impressions 
of rationales and doctrines that we could (albeit unsystematically) 
gather from a close read of cases; we are carefully and methodically 
coding this information in line with standard procedures in the social 
sciences. In short, we hope that our project will merge and 
incorporate the positive features of the legal and social science 
programs, while leaving the problematic aspects of each method 
behind.  
 
the taxpayer in only 17% of those cases. His frequent dissents were often issued without 
opinion. WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 43-44. Professor Wolfman and his coauthors 
speculate that this enigmatic behavior is founded on “a contempt for the Internal Revenue Code 
and the burdens he believes it unfairly imposes on those not able to lobby successfully for their 
special preferences.” Id. at 125.  
 39. See generally, Lee Epstein & Gary King, Empirical Research and the Goals of Legal 
Scholarship: The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 54-114 (2002). 
 40. While we focus entirely on the Supreme Court, there is a burgeoning literature on tax 
opinions in the Tax Court and in federal district and appellate courts. See, e.g., Schneider, supra 
note 4, at 332-33; Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go To Trial? An Empirical Study of 
Predictors of Failure to Settle, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 327 (1999); James Edward 
Maule, Instant Replay, Weak Teams, and Disputed Calls: An Empirical Study of Alleged Tax 
Court Judge Bias, 66 TENN. L. REV. 351, 367 (1999); Andre J. Judd & John L. Kramer, An 
Empirical Analysis of How the Tax Court Determines When Stock Becomes Worthless For 
Purposes of Loss Recognition, 66 TAXES 518 (1998); Sean Bryan et al., An Empirical Study of 
Intercircuit Conflicts on Federal Income Tax Issues, 9 VA. TAX REV. 125, 133 (1989). 
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III. OUR PROJECT 
Our primary objective is to develop a richer and more systematic 
understanding of how judges interpret the Internal Revenue Code. In 
addition, we seek to make use of this understanding in order to 
develop a richer and more systematic account of statutory 
interpretation—one that moves beyond civil rights and outcomes. As 
indicated in Part I, we plan to explore whether existing political 
preference-based accounts of judicial decision making that scholars 
have put to the test in the civil rights area (including the simple 
attitudinal and strategic decision models) hold up equally well in the 
tax area. We also hope to determine the extent to which economic 
context figures into the interpretation of the tax law, even after 
controlling for the political-institutional context. In addition, we will 
investigate whether certain rationales and policy considerations, 
which come into play when interpreting the Internal Revenue Code, 
lead to predictable outcomes. For example, is discussion of 
administrative concerns (such as the advantages of uniform, low-cost 
enforcement, minimizing bureaucratic discretion, or reducing the 
need for intrusive monitoring, information gathering, or record 
keeping) generally associated with a government victory? And are 
tax scholars correct in their view that policy considerations motivate 
tax opinions more than traditional canons of statutory interpretation? 
Addressing these and a host of related questions requires us to 
collect reams of data on the relevant cases and variables of interest. 
We have already started this process, having now identified every tax 
case decided by the Supreme Court since 1912. We did so by, first, 
undertaking a broad Lexis search in an effort to identify every 
Supreme Court case that mentioned the word “tax.”41 We then 
 
 41. The Lexis search that we conducted read as follows: (federal w/s tax!) or (excise w/s 
tax!) or (estate w/s tax!) or (user w/5 fee) or (user w/s tax!) or (tax! w/s fraud) or (irc) or (i.r.c.) 
or (stamp w/s tax!) or (income w/s tax!) or (internal w/s revenue) or (tax! w/s lien) or (tax! w/s 
code) or (tax! w/s evad!) or (tax! w/s evasion) or (corporate w/s tax!) or (payroll w/s tax!) or 
(employment w/s tax!) or (social w/s security) or (26 usc) or (26 u.s.c.) or (tax! w/s refund) or 
(tax! w/s deficiency) or (unemployment w/s tax!) or (gift w/s tax!) or (fica w/s tax!) or (f.i.c.a. 
w/s tax!). 
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reviewed each case produced by the search, retaining only those 
cases that involved an interpretation of a federal tax statute. Thus, we 
excluded state taxation cases, as well as cases that involved tax fraud 
but no statutory interpretation problem.42 This resulted in a collection 
of 2,116 distinct cases,43 dispersed over ninety Supreme Court terms 
(1912–2000). 
As Figure 5 depicts, the distribution is uneven. Whether we 
consider the sheer number of suits (the left panel) or their proportion 
of the docket (the right panel), the bulk were heard rather early in the 
twentieth century, and then the numbers dropped rather precipitously. 
Indeed, from a high water mark of .41 in 1935—meaning that tax 
cases occupied 41%(!) of the plenary docket—the proportion fell as 
low as .07 fifty years later, in 1985. 
 
 42. While we are confident that we identified every tax case in the Supreme Court, and 
thus have not run an under-inclusive search, we may have produced an over-inclusive list of 
cases. For example, we have not checked the list to ensure that customs taxes have been 
excluded—a collection of cases we have chosen not to study, given the fact that these taxes 
have come to be used more as a device for trade regulation than (as in the 18th and 19th 
centuries) as a principal source of revenue. 
 43. The unit of analysis used to compute this figure is the docket number (analu=0 or 1), 
not the case citation (0). If we use case citation, the figure falls to 1,744. We included only 
orally argued cases that resulted in a per curiam judgment or an opinion of the Court. 
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Figure 5 
Tax Cases in the U.S. Supreme Court, 1911–2000 Terms 
 
 
 
 
Note: N=2,116. The left panel shows the number of cases per term; the right panel depicts the 
proportion of the Court’s plenary docket occupied by tax cases.44 Data on the Court’s plenary 
docket are from LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM (3d ed. 2003) (Note 
that data for the number of cases on the Court’s plenary docket are unavailable prior to the 1926 
Term). For the absolute number of cases, the analu=0 or 1; for the relative proportion, the 
analu=0, which corresponds to the available caseload data. 
 
 44. Data on the tax cases will be available soon at: http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/ 
~polisci/epstein/.  
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Nonetheless—and this is a key point—despite their falling 
numbers, tax cases have continued to take up a considerable portion 
of the Court’s year-in and year-out business. Figures 1 and 2 make 
this point clear, and the data offered by Figure 5 underscore it. Across 
the entire ninety-year period, the Court ruled on an average of 23.51 
tax cases per year;45 in no single term did the Court fail to resolve at 
least one such controversy, and in some terms it resolved more tax 
cases than it now does all cases combined.46 On average, tax disputes 
occupied nearly 15% of the Court’s docket per term.47 Even as 
recently as the 2000 Term, the proportion was greater than 5%. 
For obvious reasons, the sheer number of cases presents an 
opportunity. But, because the n is so large, it also confronts us with a 
considerable challenge in the form of collecting data on the requisite 
variables. To be sure, many are relatively “easy” to collect, 
presenting few interpretive or judgmental issues, and therefore not 
raising concerns of reliability. These include the standard variables 
compiled by Spaeth in the U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database for 
decisions issued since 1953. Because of the temporal limits of the 
Spaeth database, we have had to compile corresponding information 
for the large number of tax cases handed down before the 1953 Term. 
These straightforward, case-specific independent variables include: 
 Administrative action preceding the litigation: this variable 
pertains to administrative agency activity prior to the onset 
of litigation. 
 Court that first heard the case: the focus of this variable is 
the court in which the case originated, not the 
administrative agency. 
 Source of the case: this variable identifies the court whose 
decision the Supreme Court directly reviewed. 
 
 45. Standard deviation=19.13; median=16.00. 
 46. For example, in 1935 the Court decided 91 tax cases. 
 47. The mean is .15, with a standard deviation of .09; the median is .11. 
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 Reason for granting certiorari: Occasionally, the Court 
states why it granted review; when so, we coded the reason 
given as a variable.48 
 Party 1/Party 2: Party 1 refers to the party who petitioned 
the Supreme Court to review the case, known variously as 
the petitioner or the appellant. Party 2 is conventionally 
labeled the respondent or the appellee.49 
 
 48. The categories for this variable are: 0=case did not arise on certiorari; 1=to resolve 
conflict in the federal courts; 2=to resolve conflict in the federal courts and to resolve an 
important or significant conflict; 3=to resolve putative conflict; 4=to resolve conflict between 
federal and state courts; 5=to resolve conflict in the state courts; 6=to resolve confusion or 
uncertainty in the federal courts; 7=to resolve confusion or uncertainty in the state courts; 8=to 
resolve confusion or uncertainty in the state and federal courts; 9=to resolve important or 
significant questions; 10=to resolve the questions presented; 11=the Court did not give a 
reason; 12=the Court gave a reason, but it is not one of the categories listed above. 
 49. We are coding parties into one of 23 categories: 1=Individual (not in capacity as 
Trustee, Beneficiary, Fiduciary, Proprietor, Partner, Shareholder, or Transferee); 2=Trust—
arrangement for the management of property by one or more persons (Trustees) for the benefit 
of others (Beneficiaries), that is sometimes treated as a taxpaying entity (does not include trusts 
or funds classified under Employee Benefit Plan); 3=Trustee—legal owner and manager of 
property held in trust for the benefit of beneficiaries; 4=Beneficiary—of a trust or decedent’s 
estate; 5=Fiduciary—executor, administrator, or personal representative of the estate of a 
deceased individual; 6=Proprietor—individual as sole owner of an unincorporated business; 
7=Partner—includes member of joint venture, general partnership, limited partnership, or 
limited liability company (Partner may be an individual, corporation, or even another 
partnership); 8=Partnership—unincorporated business with multiple owners, including general 
and limited partnerships, joint ventures, and limited liability companies; 9=Corporation—
corporation that is not an S Corporation, Bank, Insurance Company, or Financial Intermediary; 
10=Shareholder—owner of stock in a corporation other than an S Corporation (may be an 
individual in any capacity, or a corporation or partnership); 11=S Corporation (a/k/a Subchapter 
S Corporation)—corporation electing to have profits and losses taxed directly to shareholders, 
rather than to the corporation as a separate taxpaying entity; 12=S Corporation Shareholder—
owner of stock in an S Corporation; 13=Bank—includes savings and loan associations; 
14=Insurance Company; 15=Financial Intermediary—financial intermediary other than banks 
or insurance companies, including regulated investment companies (RICs or mutual funds) and 
real estate investment trusts (REITs); 16=Employee Benefit Plan—plan, fund, or trust to 
provide employee pensions or health or welfare benefits; 17=Charity—public charity or private 
foundation exempt from tax under I.R.C. section 501(c)(3); 18=Exempt Organization—tax-
exempt organizations other than Employee Benefit Plans and Charities (e.g., labor unions, trade 
associations, chambers of commerce, social welfare organizations, veterans groups, etc.); 
19=Transferee—recipient of property allegedly subject to tax lien; 20=Tribe—Indian tribal 
government; 21=Federal—federal government; 22=State—state government; 23=Local—local 
or municipal governmental body (cities, counties, school districts, sewer districts, etc.). 
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 Date of oral argument. 
 Date of decision. 
Other variables, however, present a far greater challenge, and 
have not previously been amassed by social scientists studying legal 
outcomes. We are collecting extensive data from the opinions to track 
the Supreme Court’s rationales in tax cases. As described below, 
these data focus on five major areas: (1) the textual and substantive 
canons of interpretation used by the Court; (2) the legislative 
documents relied upon; (3) consideration of the executive’s 
interpretation of the provision; (4) the policy concerns articulated; 
and (5) the constitutional issues addressed. 
We are coding decisions by the section(s) of the tax statute that 
they address. We made this decision, in part, because we plan to 
investigate the interpretive trends (if any) in particular areas of the 
tax law. And as noted above, we believe that the decision-makers’ 
preferences and behaviors are tied not only to the particular party in 
the litigation (taxpayer or government), but also to the specific issue 
in dispute. Considerations and constraints that affect judicial choice 
may differ, for example, if the controversy involves the Earned 
Income Tax Credit than if it involves the taxation of stock dividends. 
Consequently, the disputed section—not the case—constitutes our 
primary unit of analysis. 
For each section of the tax statute construed, we collect data on 
the interpretive methodology invoked in the Court’s opinion. These 
data are of three sorts. First, we inventory the canons of construction 
purportedly applied. Although numerous and sometimes 
contradictory, when invoked these canons effectively establish a 
presumption as to the statute’s intended meaning, based either on the 
linguistic structure of the provision (the textual canons) or the subject 
matter addressed (the substantive canons).50 
 
 50. The textual canons inventoried include the plain meaning rule, noscitur a sociis, 
ejusdem generis, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the whole act rule, and the effects of 
punctuation, headings, and the placement of the section within the statute. The substantive 
canons investigated include the rule of lenity, avoidance of constitutional problems, federalism 
concerns (deference to state authority), the presumption against implied repeals, the 
presumption in favor of coordination and consistency, the presumption against irrationality and 
injustice, the principle that exceptions to general rules should be narrowly construed, the 
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Second, we record whether the Court looked to the statute’s 
legislative background, and if so, we compile detailed information on 
the sources and documents cited in the opinion. In this connection, 
we obtain information on the Court’s discussion of the legislative 
history of the disputed provision,51 of post-enactment developments 
(subsequent legislative action or inaction), and of the relationship 
between the section at issue and other statutes (whether other sections 
of the tax statute, or other federal or state legislation). Again, in each 
instance we record only the articulated rationales—what the Court 
expressly said in its opinion—carefully refraining from reading in an 
implicit meaning or otherwise supplying an expert’s gloss. 
Third, we check for judicial consideration of the executive 
branch’s interpretation and application of the section. (Here again, we 
refer only to consideration that is acknowledged in the Court’s 
opinion.) Where executive interpretation is addressed, we inventory 
the administrative sources cited and the Court’s treatment of each 
(e.g., followed, rejected, found inconclusive).52  
Fourth, we measure the tax policy content of the Court’s opinion. 
Scholars and policy analysts from both law and public finance 
generally contend that concerns about revenue generation, 
distributive justice, and economic efficiency should (normative) 
impact judicial decision making in tax cases, and many believe that 
they often do. Apart from some specific instances, however, there is 
no systematic quantitative study of the extent to which the Court 
actually does (positive) attend to tax policy concerns. The policy 
 
presumption against implied exemptions from taxation, and the general rule that tax statutes 
should be strictly construed. 
 51. We record the following sources of legislative history: citations to the Congressional 
Record, with a specification of the type of material (bill, vote, member’s statement, written 
material submitted for publication, etc.); committee reports; committee hearings, with a 
specification of the type of material and author (for example, testimony of a Member of 
Congress, executive branch official, private witness, etc.); and studies and analyses prepared by 
the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation. We also specifically look for assertions that 
Congress knew or might have known about prior relevant administrative actions or judicial 
decisions. 
 52. The administrative sources canvassed are Treasury regulations, other administrative 
regulations, revenue procedures, revenue rulings, private letter rulings, technical advice 
memoranda, IRS acquiescence or non-acquiescence in Tax Court decisions, and other 
administrative documents (including chief counsel memoranda, actions on decisions, and field 
service advice). 
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criteria we look for includes revenue effect,53 vertical54 and horizontal 
equity, transition problems,55 administrative practicality56 (including 
the potential for tax evasion), macroeconomic issues of growth and 
stability, as well as the effect of the decision on tax subsidies or 
penalties.57  
 
 53. If the opinion addresses revenue effect we also record whether the asserted direction 
of the effect is positive (the opinion asserts that the decision is likely to increase aggregate tax 
revenues or prevent a substantial decrease in tax revenues), neutral or indeterminate (the 
opinion asserts that the decision is likely to have little impact on aggregate tax revenues, or the 
effect is indeterminate), or negative (the opinion asserts that the decision is likely to decrease 
aggregate tax revenues or prevent a substantial increase in tax revenues). The directional effect 
of the other policy criteria is recorded similarly. 
 54. The Codebook explanation currently contains the following instruction on vertical 
equity: 
 Progression means that as income rises a larger proportion of the taxpayer’s income 
is taken in taxes (not simply that taxes increase with income). Similarly, regression 
means that as income rises a smaller proportion of the taxpayer’s income is taken in 
taxes, even though the dollar amount of tax may increase monotonically with 
income. 
 Vertical equity implies that the difference in treatment between taxpayers at 
different income levels is fair. 
 55. The Codebook explanation contains the following instruction on transitional equity: 
The issue here is whether a change in tax rules imposes windfall gains or losses on 
taxpayers who acted in reliance on prior law. Delayed effective dates, phase-in rules 
and grandfather clauses are typical devices used to cushion the impact of tax 
transitions, and cases involving such transition rules are likely to invoke transitional 
equity as a rationale of decision. 
 56. Under the administrative practicality category we look for discussion of 
considerations such as promoting uniform, low-cost enforcement, minimizing bureaucratic 
discretion, and reducing the need for intrusive monitoring, information gathering, or record 
keeping. 
 57. The Codebook explanation contains the following instruction on tax subsides and 
penalties: 
 These categories—subsidies and penalties—reflect the tax expenditure analysis, that 
Congress often uses the tax law to promote other goals (non-tax objectives) by offering 
tax-based inducement (special exclusions, deductions, credits, reduced rates, or 
deferral privileges) to engage in behavior the Congress deems socially desirable. 
Ordinarily, this rationale would be present only if the case involves a provision of the 
statute that Congress enacted for the purpose of promoting such extrinsic (i.e., non-tax) 
goals, and so the issue would be the proper or intended trade-off between tax and non-
tax objectives. Accordingly, this rationale is likely to be present only if the legislative 
history of the provision sub judice indicates that the tax system is being used to 
promote other goals, so be sure to code the statutory interpretation and legislative 
history rationales. 
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Fifth (and finally), if the Court’s opinion included consideration 
of a provision of the U.S. Constitution, we record which section of 
the tax statute was the subject of a constitutional challenge, the 
asserted constitutional basis for the challenge, and the approach to 
constitutional interpretation announced in the opinion.  
IV. OBJECTIVES 
By examining all of these features of the opinions, we hope to be 
able to answer several important questions. These include: 
 Whether or to what extent the Court’s approach to statutory 
interpretation in tax cases differs from its handling of civil 
rights statutes. 
 Whether judicial assay of particular interpretive rationales 
or policy considerations in tax cases leads to predictable 
outcomes. 
 Whether expressed reliance on one or more specific canons 
of construction is associated with either a government or a 
taxpayer victory. 
 Whether attentiveness to legislative inaction or post-
enactment legislative history is a strategic move to ward off 
a legislative override of the Court’s interpretation. 
 Whether recourse to executive interpretation is negatively 
correlated with consideration of legislative materials or 
canons of construction. 
 Whether the Court’s reliance on canons of construction, 
legislative history, or particular policy considerations has 
changed over time. 
 
The two preceding categories (i.e., Economic Growth and Economic Stability) also 
present (in principle) instances of the use of the tax system to achieve non-tax social 
objectives. They are listed here as separate categories because use of the tax system to 
achieve those macroeconomic goals is more common and accepted. Code growth and 
stabilization concerns under their own categories only; reserve this category for other 
non-tax objectives. 
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 By supplementing our decisional database with information 
on the socio-economic context at the time the Court 
rendered its decision, we plan to explore whether certain 
outcomes or rationales are correlated with particular 
societal conditions. 
The ultimate goal of this project is to sort out the relative 
contributions of “law” and “politics” in Supreme Court decision-
making in tax cases. We hope to determine whether law (in the sense 
of reasoned decisions from pre-established principles) actually 
constrains the Court’s choices, or whether at the Supreme Court level 
law is indeterminate, with interpretive rationales serving merely as 
smoke screens to hide the Justices’ political preferences and preserve 
the Court’s political capital. Of course it is difficult to establish 
causality. Yet, if the results show that political preference-based 
models do a poor job of explaining outcomes in cases where the 
Court’s opinion focuses on pre-enactment legislative history, for 
example, then we may well have discovered evidence that other 
forces are at work. 
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